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1 Introduction
There is substantial literature on modelling individual residential location choices.
We restrict here our attention to some key aspects discussed below, which remain
overlooked in the litterature.
First, the set of decisions related to residential location in a multiperiod setting
typically involve a very large number of alternatives. At a given date, a choice
entails several dimensions: where to locate, which dwelling types and which tenure
status. A fine tuned demand analysis of housing choices, would consider dozens of
small geographical units for potential locations, at least two tenure types (own or
rent) and at least two dwelling types (apartment or house).
Another aspect is: who makes residential location related decisions. Recent lit-
terature (see Picard & Chiappori (2011), de Palma et al. (2013)) shows that account-
ing for intra-household negotiation processes provide a new understanding about
how residential location choices may result from consensus reached by household
members. Most of research work is yet based on unitary household approaches that
consider there is a single decision maker in the family.
∗andre.depalma@ens-cachan.fr
†matthieu.de-lapparent@ifsttar.fr. The author gratefully aknowledges Ecole Normale Supérieure
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Another point is about the dynamics of these choices. One may reasonably as-
sume that a household optimises over its lifecycle the path of decisions about labour
supply, goods/services and floor space by dwelling type consumptions, tenure sta-
tuses (Di Salvo & Ermisch (1997)), where to locate dwellings, whether housing
is used as a financial asset and whether it is left for bequest to heirs (Arrondel &
Lefebvre (2001)). All these decisions are subject to per-period financial constraints.
Also, housing markets are segmented but interacting with each other and with
other markets such as the labour market, transport activity and land development.
Prices are not always sufficient to clear the markets. Most models do not question
equilibrium, or consider only partial equilibria. There are relatively few spatial
general equilibrium or micro-simulation models with both heterogeneous agents
and markets.
Data requirements would be very stringent if one would carry out a complete
analysis at a very fine level of analysis. In general, one uses several statistical
sources and data merging procedures to prepare samples. The types of model and
their focus are often adjusted to available data.
The importance of transportation costs has been pointed out by Weisbrod et al.
(1980), Anas & Chu (1984), Waddell et al. (2007), Lee & Waddell (2010), inter
alia. They focused on the induced effects of the transportation market on residential
location choices. Accessibility to and from a residential location greatly affects
households choices.
Quigley (1985), Nechyba & Strauss (1998), Brueckner et al. (1999) focus on
the effects local amenities and neighbourhood to explain the choice of a specific
location. They show how extrinsic attributes of dwellings play a significant role
in spatial distribution of housing demand and on the corresponding market prices.
Bureau & Glachant (2010) find that market prices of owned dwellings are sensitive
to their surrounding environment.
de Palma & Lefevre (1985), Ben-Akiva & de Palma (1986) recognized that
transaction costs and moving costs may affect the dynamics of location choices
since they increase the duration of stay at one location. Any fiscal distorsion that
increases market price (either temporarily or permanently) needs to be compensated
by either a longer stay period to return on investment or larger streams of income.
Duration of stay at one location is inversely proportional to the levels of transac-
tion prices and moving costs effective in the housing market. As a consequence,
households that rent a dwelling are more mobile than households that purchase a
dwelling, because of lesser transaction costs.
de Palma et al. (2007) recently showed that existence of capacity constraints in
housing supply changes considerably location choices.
Analysis of choices of dwelling and tenure types have also been subject to sev-
eral analysis, e.g. Ioannides & Rosenthal (1974), Henderson & Ioannides (1986),
Mills (1990), Cho (1997), Skaburskis (1999). They discussed the effects on individ-
ual demand functions of the dwelling attributes (such as number of rooms, presence
of garden/balcony, age of the building, etc..). They mainly discuss the effects of
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intrinsic characteristics and how they may differ across socioeconomic and demo-
graphic groups. McFadden (1977), Weisbrod et al. (1980), Thisse (2010), Dantan
et al. (2010), Dantan & Picard (2010) also discussed in a more general way exist-
ing tradeoffs that may have consequence on location choices, including differences
across individuals with different socioeconomic characteristics.
Linneman & Wachter (1989), Zorn (1989), Brueckner (1997), Gobillon & Le
Blanc (2004), discussed the dynamics of housing expenditures of homeowners in
presence of credit rationing. He shows how the latter may not only affect the de-
mand for floor space but also the choice of a tenure type (for a given demand of floor
space) and less directly the choice of a dwelling type (since, on average, consumed
floor space is larger for houses than for apartments).
In this paper, we propose a theoretical microeconomic model to analyze resi-
dential choices of households in a dynamic context with perfect information. The
decision maker is a household. We do not envisage intra-household negotiation
between members. We consider that the household lives two periods. Addressing
simultaneously economic choices of residential location, dwelling and tenure and
their dynamics, while accounting for interaction with transportation market, with
demand for local amenities, and with financial investment constraints represent the
main focus of the paper.
At the beginning of each period, household is endowed with a per-period utility
function that depends on the level of amenities, the level of floor space, and the level
of consumption of a composite good. It is faced with continuous and discrete deci-
sions: choices of optimal quantity of floor space, consumption level of an outside
composite good, and the choices of residential location, tenure and dwelling types.
Indeed, these choices are subject to budget and technical constraints. In our model,
borrowing is allowed in the first period, but not in the second one: no debt can be
left when at the beginning of a third period. We also assume that the interest rate
is higher when borrowing for a dwelling than when saving/borrowing on the money
market (this is a form of credit imperfection). We do not consider any selection
mechanism: every household can borrow money for housing purpose. Transaction
costs apply to real estate (acts made by notaries or lawyers but also local taxes). We
consider existence of moving costs whenever changing home location in the second
period. Of course, transportation costs affect the choices of households. Another
feature of our model is the introduction of a bequest motive. The household leaves
a bequest to heirs at the end of his/her lifecycle for altruistic reasons, which enters
in the third period utility. The bequest consists in money and/or in real estate.
The household program is to maximise the sum of discounted flows of utility
over its lifecycle subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint. The problem can
be solved in two preliminary steps, then by backward induction. First, we compute
for each combination of locations, tenure and dwelling types, optimal demands for
floor space and consumption of a composite good. Second, we derive the associ-
ated indirect utility functions. The household chooses the combination of locations
(hence levels of amenities), tenure and dwelling types that maximises its utility. The
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levels of optimal (continuous) demands adjust to these optimlal (discrete) choices.
We detail our theoretical model in Section 2. We discuss the mathematical for-
mulation and related solutions of the household optimisation program. We choose
functional forms which lead to analytically tractable theoretical model of inter-
temporal utility maximization. We study the effects of the most relevant ingredients
of residential location choices: demand for local amenities, financial constraints
(pay-down requirement, borrowings and savings), housing and goods/services prices,
income, transaction costs, transportation and moving costs.
In Section 3, we then turn to an empirical application. We present data in the
first subsection. Our main data source is the 2006 French Housing Survey, which
comprises a short retrospective survey back to 2002. We focus on the population
living in Paris region during these years. Due to lack of statistical information about
precise locations of dwellings, we restrict our analysis to the dynamics of tenure
and dwelling types choices given location choices. Also, since the survey is based
on revealed preferences, we need to buid conterfactuals and impute values of the
attributes of unchosen alternatives. To this extent, we use data on credit from the
survey and from the Côtes Callon. The latter provides average observed market
prices by tenure type for 2002 and 2006. We also address the problem of missing
information about precise locations of dwellings: we only have information about
the “département” (large French administrative unit) where households live. There-
fore we cannot compute any reliable transportation costs. The moving costs are
accounted for through a dummy variable indicating whether the household moved
between 2002 and 2006. In a second subsection, we propose an econometric spec-
ification of the theoretical model accounting for data availability and identification
constraints. Our approach is based on random utility maximization. It takes the
form of a Nested Logit choice model, see for example McFadden (1977), Train
(2003). We discuss estimation results in the third subsection.
We conclude in a last section and argue that our theoretical model can be used
as a building block for detailed analysis of residential location choices.
2 A microeconomic model of residential choices
We consider a household living 2 periods j ∈ {1, 2}. A bequest B is transmitted to
heirs at period 3. At the beginning of each period, the household has to choose its
dwelling location, its dwelling type, its tenure type, and the levels of consumption of
floor space, composite good, and local amenities. The latter are actually not really
chosen but instead determined by residential location choices.
2.1 Household preferences
At the beginning of every period j ∈ {1, 2}, a household obtains utility u from
consumption of floor space Q, local amenities x, and a composite good C (exclud-
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ing dwelling). We define by uj (xj , Cj , Qj) the household utility in period j. We
assume that uj (·) is strictly increasing and quasi-concave in its arguments.
The utility of a household over its lifecycle is measured at the beginning of
the first period. It is defined as the discounted sum period-specific utilities plus
the level of bequest B left to heirs at period 3 (bequest is transmitted once the
household disappears). We denote by β ∈ [0, 1] the discount factor. The resulting
intertemporal utility function U (·) is defined as
U (x1, C1, Q1, x2, C2, Q2, B) =
u1 (x1, C1, Q1) + βu2 (x2, C2, Q2) + β
2γ2 ln (B)
(1)
and we further assume that uj (·) has a Cobb-Douglas mathematical formulation
uj (xj , Cj , Qj , B) = ψj (xj) + αj ln (Cj) + (1− αj) ln (Qj) , j ∈ {1, 2} . (2)
If the household does not change dwelling in period 2, floor space consumption
is determined once for all in period 1, i.e. Q2 = Q1. We assume that the level
of consumed amenities may change over time whenever location is the same. The
intertemporal utility function simplifies to
U (x1, C1, Q1, x2, C2, Q1, B) =
u1 (x1, C1, Q1) + βu2 (x2, C2, Q1) + β
2γ2 ln (B)
(3)
2.2 Budget constraints
Choices of household are made under finite budget constraints. Before writing ex-
plicitly the inter temporal budget constraint of the household, we need first to define
further notations. For each period j ∈ {1, 2}, we assume that tenure type (kj)
corresponds to either owning (oj) or renting (rj), dwelling type (dj) corresponds
to either house (hj) or flat (fj), and location corresponds to a predetermined geo-
graphical zone lj in a region that is divided into L mutually exclusive units.
Let pikj ,dj ,ljt
(
xj,lj
)
be the price (per unit of surface) in period t ∈ {1, 2, 3} , t >
j, of a dwelling located at lj that is occupied by the household in period j. Whatever
dj , kj or lj , the household is faced with additional transaction costs when consid-
ering dwelling consumption. These are of two types. The first applies only once to
the transaction itself when purchasing or renting a dwelling, often under the form
of a proportional tax rather than a lump sum. Let µkj ,dj ,ljj > 0 be this unit tax level.
The second applies to the occupation of the dwelling and is recurrent over time as
long as the dwelling is occupied. It mainly models local taxes. Let then κkj ,dj ,ljj be
the unit tax level.
Prices of the composite good are defined as pj , j ∈ {1, 2}1.
1Note that it means that prices of the composite good does not differ across zones in the considered
region.
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The household is endowed a strictly positive level of (exogenous) income Rj at
the beginning of each period j ∈ {1, 2}. As household members have to participate
in out-of-home activities, e.g. work or education, Dj
(
xj,lj , yj
)
> 0 is a transporta-
tion cost in period j for a residential location l and a set of locations to be reached
yj , j ∈ {1, 2}2.
Let also Sj model monetary savings at period j ∈ {1, 2}. For j = 2, it corre-
sponds to the level of monetary bequest left to heirs, and we assume that S2 ≥ 0.
When j = 1, it can be either positive or negative. If positive, the return on money
savings is rj > 0, j ∈ {1, 2}. We assume that the household can borrow money
only during the first period (out of two) of its lifecycle. It is excluded to leave
debts to heirs. If money is borrowed in period j = 1, the household contracts a
loan that has to be reimbursed during the second period j = 2. The interest rate
of the loan is τ1. We assume that τ1 > r1. If money is borrowed for housing pur-
pose, as the household must pay down a fraction ρ ∈ [0, 1] of the total dwelling
price, only the remaining portion has to be reimbursed in period 2. By convention,
ρ = 1 when dwelling is rented in period 1 (no borrowing is allowed for renting),
and µrj ,dj ,ljj = 0.
There is yet one component to consider. When household makes the choice
to change dwelling in period 2, moving costs affecting the budget constraint may
occur. We model them by ∆ (x1,l1 , x2,l2) ≥ 0. By convention, these costs are equal
to zero when not changing dwelling.
The budget constraint for the first period is then
p1C1 +
[(
1 + µk1,d1,l11
)
ρ+ κk1,d1,l11 (x1)
]
pik1,d1,l11 (x1,l1)Q1 + S1 =
R1 −D1 (x1,l1 , y1)
(4)
The budget constraint in period 2 is more involved:
p2C2 +
[
(1 + τ1)
(
1 + µk1,d1,l11
)
(1− ρ)
]
pik1,d1,l11 (x1,l1)Q1
+
[
1 + µk2,d2,l22 + κ
k2,d2,l2
2 (x2,l2)
]
pik2,d2,l22 (x2,l2)Q2 + S2
= (1 + r1)S1 +R2 −D2 (x2,l2 , y2)−∆ (x1,l1 , x2,l2)
+pio1,d1,l12 (x1,l1)Q1I1y2,
(5)
where I1y2 is a dummy variable indicating that dwelling bought in period 1 may be
sold in period 2.
2Note that yj is a vector when many household members work and/or when considering other
locations than workplaces. Note also that x is an argument of the transportation cost function as
presence of public transport or any special transport infrastructure may be considered as amenities for
location lj and may have effect on the level of transportation costs.
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We can combine equations 4 and 5 to obtain the intertemporal budget constraint:
(1 + r1) p1C1 + p2C2 + S2
+

(
1 + µk1,d1,l11
)[
ρ+
(
1+τ
k1,d1,l1
1
)
(1−ρ)
1+r1
]
+κk1,d1,l11 (x1,l1)
 (1 + r1)pik1,d1,l11 (x1,l1)Q1
+
((
1 + µk2,d2,l22
)
+ κk2,d2,l22 (x2,l2)
)
pik2,d2,l22 (x2,l2)Q2
= (1 + r1) (R1 −D1 (x1,l1 , y1)) +R2 −D2 (x2,l2 , y2)
−∆ (x1,l1 , x2,l2) + pio1,d1,l12 (x1,l1)Q1I1y2
(6)
This general constraint further simplifies when considering specific series of dis-
crete residential choices. For instance:
• if kj = rj then ρ = 1, τ1 = 0, µrj ,dj ,ljj = 0;
• if l1 = l2 then d1 = d2, Q2 = Q1, and ∆ (x1,l1 , x2,l1) = 0 by convention.
2.3 Bequest function
The dwelling(s) transmitted at the beginning of period 3, if any, were necessarily
bought previously. For j = 1, 2, we denote by Ijy3 the dummy variable indicating
that a dwelling is bought in period j and transmitted to heirs at period 3. The total
value of the bequest evaluated in period 3 is therefore:
B = pio1,d1,l13 (x1,,l1)Q1I1y3 + pi
o2,d2,l2
3 (x2,l2)Q2I2y3 + (1 + r2)S2, (7)
2.4 Characterization of the solution
Consider now that the household is able to compute optimal demands and derived
indirect utility function for each possible trajectory of discrete decisions. It would
then compares the levels of utility of every possible series of decisions and it selects
the one that maximizes its utility. As modellers, we want to define more precisely
these optimal demands and indirect utility functions so as to develop a structural
framework.
We proceed in two steps to solve the problem of the household. We consider
in a first step that the household chooses one of the possible trajectories of discrete
residential choices, i.e. location, tenure and dwelling types. Given prices and budget
resources, its problem is then to determine its optimal demands for floor spaces Q1
and Q2 and other consumption expenditures C1, C2 plus a potential level of savings
S2 due to bequest behaviour so as to maximize an intertemporal utility function
subject to budget constraints.
We however have to account for two key decisions. The first regards whether to
move from one dwelling to another in between period 1 and period 2. The second
regards whether to leave housing or savings as bequest to heirs. Combination of
both does not give the same maximization program.
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In a second step, once obtained optimal demands and savings, thus the associ-
ated indirect utility function, and still considering that the household is maximiz-
ing its utility function, the optimal series of discrete choices is the one that corre-
sponds to the conditional (to discrete residential choices) indirect utility function
that reaches the largest level.
2.4.1 On bequest composition
As already stated, the solution of the problem depends on the composition of the
bequest, which in turn depends on whether markets are perfect. We make some
proposition accounting only for tenure type but extension to account simultane-
ously for tenure and dwelling types would just introduce more complexity without
improving understanding of our baseline assumptions.
Definition 1. Full perfection holds if
• r1 = r2 = τ1 ≡ r
• µo11 = µo22 = 0
• κo11 (x1) = κo22 (x2) ≡ κ
• pibj (xj) = pirj (xj) , j = 1, 2
• (1 + rt)pibt (xj) = pibt+1 (xj) , j = 1, 2, t = 1, 2.
In order to simplify notations, we define implicit prices :
Π0Q1 =
{(
1 + µl1
)
[(1 + r1) ρ+ (1 + τ1) (1− ρ)] + (1 + r1)κl1 (x1)
}
pil1 (x1)
Π0Q2 =
[(
1 + µl2
)
+ κl2 (x2)
]
pil2 (x2)
Π0C1 = (1 + r1) p1
Π0C2 = p2
Π0S2 = 1
(8)
Lemma 1. Full perfection implies that the relative implicit prices in the bequest
equation are equal to the relative prices in the intertemporal budget constraint:
Π0Q1
pib3 (x1)
=
Π0Q2
pib3 (x2)
=
1
(1 + r2)
Proof. The result is straightforward by applying the simplifications implied by full
perfection in Equations (6) and (7).
Lemma 2. Under full perfection, and with no budget constraints (S1 ≷ 0), at the
optimal solution, the household is indifferent between renting and buying, and the
bequests are transmitted indifferently as real estate or money. The problem reduces
to the maximization of a standard Cobb-Douglas function
Cα11 Q
1−α1
1 C
βα2
2 Q
β(1−α2)
2 S
β2γ2
2
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under the simplified intertemporal budget constraint:
(1 + r) p1C1 + p2C2 + S2 + (1 + r) (1 + κ)pi
l
1 (x1)Q1 + (1 + κ)pi
l
2 (x2)Q2
= (1 + r) [R1 −D1 (x1, y1)] + [R2 −D2 (x2, y2)−∆ (x1, x2)] .
Proof. Indifference between renting and buying results from the absence of budget
constraints associated with the conditions pibj (xj) = pi
r
j (xj) , j = 1, 2 and µ
b
1 =
µb2 = 0. Lemma 1 implies that real estate has exactly the same value whether is
is transmitted as real estate or sold at period 2 (or at period 1 when relevant), and
the corresponding value is transmitted to heirs as a monetary bequest S2. We can
therefore assume that dwellings are rented at both periods, and only a monetary
bequest is transmitted.
Proposition 1. There exists exactly one form of bequest, entailing either real estate
(bought either in first or in second period), or money if and only if the three ratios
Π0Q1
pib3(x1)
6= Π
0
Q2
pib3(x2)
6= 1(1+r2) .
Proof. According to Lemma 1, when the three ratios are equal, interior solutions
with composite bequest (entailing both real estate and money) are optimal. The
reciprocical part proceeds by contradiction. Consider an optimal solution denoted
by {C∗1 , Q∗1, C∗2 , Q∗2, S∗2}. Assume, without loss of generality, that pi
b
3(x1)
Π0Q1
> 1 + r2
Assume further I1y3 = 1 and S2 > 0. Consider an infitesimal change ∆ > 0
such that Q∗1 is replaced with Q∗1 − ∆Π0Q1 < Q
∗
1 and C
∗
1 is replaced with C
∗
1 +
∆
(1+r1)p1
. The total cost of this infinitesimal change is zero, so intertemporal util-
ity remains unchanged. Consider an additional change such that S∗2 is replaced
with S∗2 +
∆pib3(x1)
(1+r2)Π0Q1
and first period consumption of composite good becomes
C∗1 +
∆
(1+r1)p1
− 1(1+r1)p1
∆pib3(x1)
(1+r2)Π0Q1
= C∗1 +
(
1− pi
b
3 (x1)
(1 + r2) Π0Q1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 since
pib3(x1)
Π0
Q1
>1+r2
∆
(1+r1)p1
< C∗1 .
The total cost of this additional infinitesimal change is zero, so intertemporal utility
remains unchanged. The second change moves the total bequest back to its ini-
tial value (here, we use I1y3 = 1). The combination of these two infinitesimal
changes leaves intertemporal utility, total bequest value, and second-period utility
unchanged. As a result, it leaves first-period utility unchanged. This is in contradic-
tion with the decrease in both C1 and Q1, since u1 (·) is increasing in its arguments.
Similarly, considering Q∗2 → Q∗2 − ∆Π0Q1 < Q
∗
2 and C
∗
2 → C∗2 + ∆p2 proves that
pib3(x2)
Π0Q2
> 1 + r2, I2y3 = 1 and S2 > 0 cannot hold simultaneously. Finally, a
similar infinitesimal change in Q∗1, C∗1 , Q∗2 and C∗2 leaving both total bequest and
total cost unchanged proves that pi
b
3(x2)
Π0Q2
6= pib3(x1)
Π0Q1
, I1y3 = 1 and I2y3 = 1 cannot
hold simultaneously.
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Proposition 1 implies that, under perfect foresight, the case in which the house-
hold owns and transmits to heirs both the dwelling where it lives in period 1 and the
dwelling where it lives in period 2 cannot be optimal when the relative (implicit)
price of these two assets is not the same in period 2 and in period 3, which constitues
a systematic imperfection in real estate markets in Paris region. It happens that, in
our dataset, this case represents less than 1% of the sample. This low percentage is
consistent with unanticipated changes in personal or professional situation over the
life cycle (such unanticipated changes are ignored in lour model).
2.4.2 Optimal series of discrete choices
Another result of our model is that, once solved the intertemporal optimization pro-
gram, the indirect utility functions for every sequence of tenure and dwelling types
write using only two different mathematical formulations:
V¯l1,l2,d1,d2,k1,k2 =
Ωl1,l2,d1,d2,k1,k2 − λ0Q1 ln
(
Πl1,d1,k11
)
− λ0Q2 ln
(
Πl2,d2,k22
)
+ λ ln (W (x1, x2))
for movers and
V¯l1,l1,d1,d1,k1,k2 =
Ωl1,l1,d1,d1,k1,k2 − λ1Q1 ln
(
Πl1,d1,k11 + Π
l1,d1,k2
2
)
+ λ ln (W (x1, x1))
for non movers where
• λ0Q1 = (1− α1) + β2γ2I1y3,
• λ0Q2 = β (1− α2) + β2γ2I2y3,
• λ1Q1 = (1− α1) + β (1− α2) + β2γ2I1y3
• λ = 1 + β + β2γ2
• Ω’s are functions of the possible choices, the exogenous variables, and the
parameters of U
The optimal series of discrete choices is solution of
max
(
max
l1,l2,d1,d2,k1,k2
(
V¯l1,l2,d1,d2,k1,k2
)
, max
l1,l1,d1,d1,k1,k2
(
V¯l1,l1,d1,d1,k1,k2
))
(9)
3 Application
We present in this section a probabilistic discrete choice to analyze dynamics of
tenure and dwelling types given locations. We focus on the population of inhabitants
that lived and may have moved within the Paris region in 2002 and 2006.
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3.1 Data
Empirical implementation of our theoretical model is data demanding in that we
need to have available at least longitudinal disaggregate data but not only.
Our main data source is the 2006 French National Housing Survey (FNHS).
It reports observed housing choices of French households during this year and it
briefly reports those made in 2002. For these two years, we also observe socioeco-
nomic and demographic characteristics of these decision makers. We however point
out that available information is somewhat limited for year 2002.
As the 2006 FNHS is a revealed preference survey, we don’t have any informa-
tion about unchosen alternatives. We therefore need to complement this survey by
drawing statistical information from other data sources, especially regarding hous-
ing prices. To this extent, we will use 2003 and 2007 Côtes Callon.
Furthermore, it appears that some of the attributes of all the likely alternatives,
especially as it regards local amenities, are not described. As it regards our problem,
we see mainly two demanding requirements: information about prices by location,
dwelling and tenure types, and information about local amenities by location.
3.1.1 Sample formation
We have initially 6988 observations. When we look at combinations of tenue and
dwelling types at these dates, we observe that only 5 of them appears enough sig-
nificant. They are written italics in table 1.
Table 1: Matrix of tenure and dwelling types in 2002 and 2006
Dwelling types (2002, 2006)
Tenure types (2002, 2006) (h,h) (h,f) (f,h) (f,f) Total
Move, (o,o), keep 23 9 10 16 58
Move, (o,o), resell 53 14 44 46 157
Move, (o,r), keep 3 17 1 14 35
Move, (o,r), resell 7 10 4 17 38
No move, (o,o) 1440 0 0 967 2407
No move, (o,r) 33 0 0 19 52
Move, (r,o) 25 6 133 170 334
Move, (r,r) 18 41 60 809 928
No move, (r,o) 25 0 0 35 60
No move, (r,r) 171 0 0 2748 2919
Total 1798 97 252 4841 6988
o: own, r: rent; h: house, f: flat; ( , ) is defined as (type in 2002 , type in 2006)
Move, No move: change home or not, Keep, resell: keep formerly owned home or resell it
For the rest of our application, we will not consider choice situations where
a household moves in between 2002 and 2006 and keep its owned dwelling that
11
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served as a residence in 2002 whatever its new tenure type. We also won’t the choice
situation where a household changes tenure type from owner to renter. Finally, we
won’t consider the situation where a household may become owner of the dwelling
it was renting in the former period: there is an obligation to change dwelling.
We virtually have 5 sequences of tenure types by 4 sequences of dwelling types
but, by natural constraint, we have to remove 4 of them. We then have 16 choice
situations. We observe that our 6745 remaining observations greatly favours non
moving choices. Only 1419 observations (21.04% ) concern moving households.
We also observe that:
• shift in tenure type from rental to ownership if closely related to households
that move from an apartment to a house. The reciprocal exists but it is not
that much important;
• move and ownership at both periods is often associated to a non change in
dwelling type;
• house renting is not a very usual choice.
3.1.2 Attributes of unchosen alternatives
As already stated, the 2006 FNHS is a revealed preference survey. We only have
description of what has been done but not what may have been done. As we want
to parametrize and estimated a probabilistic choice model, one important task is
to reconstruct pertinent variables that describe attributes of unchosen alternatives.
For other reasons, we also have missing data that describe characteristics of some
households. We can use some secondary tables of the 2006 FNHS but it is not
enough: we need to draw additional information from other data sources. Data
imputation is made using standard statistical techniques and developing a series of
auxiliary descriptive models. We discuss and present them in this subsubsection.
First of all, we remind the reader that we don’t have accurate information about
locations of dwellings. We only have locations at the “département” level, a very
large administrative geographical unit (there are only 8 département for the region
we consider). Even though we stated that we present a model of dwelling and tnure
types given locations, we would have prefered to have available these variables at
least to be able to compute less roughly housing prices for unchosen alternatives.
This is not the case and, as a result:
• we are not able to compute any transportation cost or accessibility indicator;
• housing prices that we will compute for unchosen alternatives will be at the
“département” geographical scale.
In order to reconstruct housing prices, we firstly need some external baseline
data. We will use 2003 and 2007 Côtes Callon (data collected during years 2002
and 2006), which provide average housing prices for apartments and houses in sev-
eral locations of the region and for different levels of comfort and quality of the
12
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dwellings. We compute weighted average housing prices for apartments and houses
at the “département” level”. Weights are drawn from the 2006 census of popula-
tion and consider only age of the building. We also assume that these weights did
not change in between 2002 and 2006 so that we use them to obtain our necessary
housing prices for year 2002.
Secondly, we also need to convert both purchasing and renting prices to some
comparable unit. To this extent, we will convert purchasing prices to “pseudo”
renting prices. We will base our analysis on the “mortgage” table of the 2006 FNHS
that regards housing loans that were contracted by French inhabitants of the Paris
region (disregarding our sample selection) for the dwelling they purchased earlier
and currently live in. Using an auxiliary regression model, we then will be able to
impute missing information about mortgage level, pay-down fraction and interest
rate for household that actually chose to rent.
Another point is about how to deal with non moving households when recon-
structing variables of choice alternatives that imply it to move from one location to
another. Here again, we have to constrain our approach. A brief look at the data
shows that about 71.20% of moving households stay in the same “département”.
Another look at the 2006 Census of population also shows that many households
keep rather conservative in their choices of new residence place. For our model,
we will then assume that if a non moving household would have chosen to change
dwelling in between 2002 and 2006, it would then have been in the same “départe-
ment”.
We now list what we assumed to reconstruct housing prices for every considered
household in our sample:
• non moving households would have chosen the same “département” if they
had chosen to change dwelling
• for owners, we assume for each dwelling type that the renting price is given
by the corresponding average rental price per square metre at the level of
“département” computed from Côtes Callon;
• for renters, we proceed in 3 steps:
– we draw for each dwelling type the average purchasing price per square
metre at the level of “département”;
– we impute how much, how long, and at which interest rate would be a
mortgage to buy the dwelling. To impute the values of these variables,
we adjust a hierarchical simultaneous equation system by full informa-
tion likelihood method. We use the “mortgage” table of the 2006 FNHS
that regards housing loans that were contracted by French inhabitants
of the Paris region for the dwelling they purchased earlier and currently
live in. Our specification is rather simple: we assume that the mortgage
amount is function of income per capita, age of the household head,
and household size. Mortgage duration is function of the ratio between
13
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mortgage amount and total household income. Mortage interest rate is
function of mortgage duration and a year-specific variable. Quality of
fit is rather good for a such simple system and estimates are along with
intuition. We obtain that mortgage amount is an increasing function of
income per capita and follows a U-shape with respect to age of house-
hold head. It is also an increasing function of household size. Duration
of a mortgage is and increasing function of the ratio between amount and
income. Naturally, interest rate decreases in between 2002 and 2006 and
is a decreasing function of the duration. Estimates are reported in table
2.
Table 2: Mortgage-related system of equations
Log. of amount equation
Label of variable Estimate T-stat.
Intercept 6.66 6.68
Log. of income per capita 0.62 6.84
Age of household head -0.10 -6.67
Age of household head squared 0.001 5.81
Log. of household size 0.27 4.03
Log. of duration equation
Intercept 2.59 259.80
Log. of ratio between amount and total income 0.16 24.28
Log.of interest rate equation
Intercept 3.57 7.77
Ia: year 2002 0.21 6.27
Log. of duration -0.91 -5.23
Number of observations 1628
Overal ρ2 0.78
a: I: dummy variable
– we then impute how much would be the monthly reimbursement amount
for renters in our sample (as already stated, we need to make comparable
housing purchasing and monthly rental prices per square meter). To this
extent, we use simple financial mathematics. We assume that household
i buy a dwelling of type k in location l by means of a mortgage. An
amount equal to (1− ρi)pi per square meter is borrowed over a period
of Ti years at an annual interest rate of τi. ρi is the fraction of down
payment and pik,l is the purchasing price per square meter. The monthly
expenditure in housing per meter square is defined as the fixed monthly
reimbursement Ci,k,l:
Ci,k,l =
τpik,l
1− (1 + τ)−T . (10)
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We finally merge these imputed values with these related to the revealed choices
of households. We now have available a set of housing prices for every observed
and likely housing choice of all households.
3.1.3 Income and wealth
We also miss 2002 income levels. Actually, we have 2006 income levels but some
observations are also missing. We proceed as it is often done in many applications
to impute missing values of this variable for year 2006. We fit a type II Tobit model
(also known as generalized Tobit model). The first part of the model consists in
explaining non reporting of the income variable by some households. The second
part of the model consists in explaining the levels of incomes of households using
only the subset of observed income levels and correcting for this sample selection
bias. Estimates are reportted in table 3.
Table 3: Imputation of income variable
Selection equation
Label of variable Estimate T-stat.
Intercept 0.84 33.02
Ia: household head is an active worker 0.33 11.94
I: household head is unemployed -0.14 -3.99
I: household head is retired 0.36 12.11
Log. of 2006 income equation
Intercept 7.14 148.47
Log. of age of household head 0.48 39.21
Log. of household size 0.48 81.34
I: household head is an active worker 0.91 68.16
I: household head is unemployed 0.04 2.54
I: household head is retired 0.54 34.53
I: household lives in Paris 0.02 1.50
I: household lives in Seine-et-Marne 0.14 6.93
I: household lives in Yvelines 0.23 10.63
I: household lives in Essonnes 0.16 8.71
I: household lives in Hauts-de-Seine 0.11 6.15
I: household lives in Seine-Saint-Denis -0.13 -7.89
I: household lives in Val de Marne 0.06 3.22
I: household lives in Val d’Oise 0.07 3.82
Standard deviation of error term 0.58 272.49
Correlation of error terms -0.00 -0.00
Overall ρ2 0.58
a: I: dummy variable
Here again, we use a simple specification of the model. Goodness-of-fit of the
model is not as good as we would expect but we use these results to impute both
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missing values of income R for years 2006 and 2002. The latter is made using part
of socio-demographic information we have available at this year in the survey. Of
course, we implicitely assume that the relation between the dependent variables and
the exogenous variables stays constant over the 2002− 2006 period.
We finally compute wealth as R2002 + R20061+r where r is defined as the interest
rate of a risk-free monetary asset. In our application, it is defined as a 4 years
investment in the french “livret A”:
(1 + r)4 =
∏2005
t=2002
(1 + it) (11)
where it, t = 2002, · · · , 2005, are drawn from data of “Banque de France”.
3.1.4 Transportation and moving costs
We don’t have any accurate measurement of these variables in data. We also are
limited as it regards locations of dwellings. Furthermore, we don’t have any infor-
mation about automobile ownership and use at the household level. Finally, there
is nothing about travel behaviour of households. There is no possibility to compute
variables that regard transportation costs or moving costs.
3.2 Model specification
We now turn to the econometric specification of our probabilistic discrete choice
model.
3.2.1 Choice set
The first step is to elaborate a little bit more on the structure of the choice set we
consider. We focus here on dynamics of dwelling and tenure types at two spaced
dates. There exists several ways to nests the different dimensions of our choice set.
We assume the following. Firstly, dwelling type for year 2002 is chosen. Then,
tenure type for year 2002 is chosen. In between 2002 and 2006, the choice to move
or not is made. In year 2006 is made again the choice of a tenure type and then a
dwelling type. We may have privileged the choice of a dwelling type prior to the
choice of a tenure type or even other combination of the sequence of choices. The
search of the most relevant combination is left aside for future research work. Figure
1 summarizes the nesting structure of choices we consider for our application.
3.2.2 Indirect utility functions
Because of missing statistical information, proxy variables, measurement errors,
and because we only observe choices, we assume that the indirect utility function
for household i are continuous random variables
Vi,xi,1,xi,2,di,1,di,2,ti,1,ti,2 = V¯i,xi,1,xi,2,di,1,di,2,ti,1,ti,2 + i,xi,1,xi,2,di,1,di,2,ti,1,ti,2
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Figure 1: Sequence of choices
and
Vi,xi,1,xi,2,di,1,di,1,ti,1,ti,1 = V¯i,xi,1,xi,2,di,1,di,1,ti,1,ti,1 + i,xi,1,xi,2,di,1,di,1,ti,1,ti,1
We also assume that parameters of the utility function (α’s and γ) are function
of the characteristics of the household (here, household size)
3.2.3 Probabilistic formulation
’s enter additively and are independent from observed variables. For each ob-
served household, they are distributed with a GEV distribution, i → F (i) =
exp (−H (i;σ)). The choice probabilities are defined as
Pr (xi,1, xi,2, di,1, di,2, ti,1, ti,2) =
exp
(
V¯i,xi,1,xi,2,di,1,di,2,ti,1,ti,2
) ∂H(exp(V¯i);σ)
∂ exp
(
V¯i,xi,1,xi,2,di,1,di,2,ti,1,ti,2
)H (exp (V¯i);σ)−1
(12)
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H is chosen to satisfy the nested structure of choices as presented in figure 1. It
takes the form of a 5-level Nested Logit model. There are effects of lower choices
in the tree on related upper choices (“logsum”, i.e. effect of maximum expected
utility of a subsequent choice on current choice). We refer the reader to McFadden
(1977), Ben-Akiva & Lerman (1985), Train (2003) for explicit formulation of these
choice probabilities.
3.3 Results
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood method. Estimates are reported in
tables 4 and 5. We observe several significant effects, all along with theory and
common practive.
It is found that household is sensitive to floor space consumption (1− α’s coef-
ficients) and that this sensitivity increases with household size. We also remark that
the ratio of periodic sensitivities is larger than 1, as expected, meaning that there
exists a strictly positive (and lower thatn 1) discounting factor. There also exists a
significant bequest effect as scaled γ is found to be positive. Accumulating assets,
whatever they take the form of money or housing, increases household’s level of
utility. We are however not sure whether it directly regards heirs or future period
of the household as we did not control for lifecycle effects. Anyway, data shows
that there exists a positive effect in accumulating assets for future periods of life,
whichever they regards the household or its heirs.
Results also show that there are different effects of socio-economic and demo-
graphic characteristics on dynamics of delling and tenure types. Income has a posi-
tive effect on the probability to choose a house instead of an apartment. It also has
a positive effect on the probability to move, i.e. to change dwelling, over time. This
is not surprising as it the relative contribution of moving costs are then lesser and
that the relative larger purchasing power favours consumption of more space and a
more private type of dwelling (no direct up and down neighbours).
We also observe that the structure of a household and its evolution affects the
sequence of dwelling and tenure types. Actually, it is found that work status of the
household head change the way housing is consumed. If he/she retires in the second
period then he/she anticipated a lowering of his/her household income and then
privileges the choice to own in the first period and then stay in the same dwelling.
If he/she is unemployed in the second period, he/she prefers to rent in both period
and move to another dwelling. Any choice that involves ownership in either the first
or the second period is ranked down. If he/she is unemployed in both period, then
renting the same dwelling both periods is favoured. We also observe that if he/she
is a student in 2002 and then work in 2006, what is favoured is renting during the
first period and then buying in the second period.
When there is a change in workplace or job type of any household member,
the probability to move is increasing. Such a result is along with the fact that the
household looks at minimizing transportation costs. We also find that a variation
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of the household size has an asymmetrivcal effect on the probability to move: an
increase of the size favours change of dwelling but a decrase of size does not affect
significantly the proability to move.
Finally, All the same, there is a “natural” trend in prefering to consume flat
rather than houses.
Table 4: Estimates of the discrete choice model
Label Est. T-stat.
Intercepts:
dwelling type is house in 2002, same dwelling in 2002 and 2006b -0.94 -3.48
dwelling type is house in 2002, movec -1.26 -3.96
dwelling type is house in 2006, moved -1.30 -3.18
move -1.71 -4.89
HH head works in 2002 and is unemployed in 2006, effects ona:
own in 2002 and 2006 and move -2.76 -4.49
own in 2002 and 2006 and stay -2.00 -9.93
rent in 2002 and own in 2006 and move -0.94 -2.84
rent in 2002 and 2006 and move 0.16 1.77
HH head works in 2002 and is retired in 2006, effects ona:
own in 2002 and 2006 and move 0.00 0.01
own in 2002 and 2006 and stay 0.72 4.73
rent in 2002 and own in 2006 and move 0.35 1.53
rent in 2002 and 2006 and move -0.26 -1.29
HH head is unemployed in 2002 and works in 2006, effects ona:
own in 2002 and 2006 and move -2.67 -3.01
own in 2002 and 2006 and stay -1.75 -5.16
rent in 2002 and own in 2006 and move -1.48 -2.20
rent in 2002 and 2006 and move 0.07 0.57
HH head is unemployed in 2002 and in 2006, effects ona:
own in 2002 and 2006 and stay -0.87 -4.95
rent in 2002 and own in 2006 and move -1.43 -2.13
rent in 2002 and 2006 and move -0.12 -1.02
HH head is retired in 2002 and in 2006, effects ona:
own in 2002 and 2006 and move -1.12 -2.78
own in 2002 and 2006 and stay 0.58 5.50
rent in 2002 and own in 2006 and move -1.19 -3.36
rent in 2002 and 2006 and move -0.63 -3.03
HH head is student in 2002 and works in 2006, effects ona:
own in 2002 and 2006 and stay -2.23 -3.22
rent in 2002 and own in 2006 and move 0.37 1.23
rent in 2002 and 2006 and move 0.61 2.67
Looking now at the inclusive values, i.e. “logsum effects”, these are all in line
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with theoretical constraint that ensure that the probabilistic model actually derives
from random utility maximization. They all exhibit existence of “within-nest” sub-
stitution patterns.
Table 5: Estimates of the discrete choice model, cont’d
Label Est. T-stat.
Income:
dwelling type is a house in 2002e 0.09 5.54
dwelling type is a house in 2006 f 0.17 3.08
moveg 0.08 2.44
HH member other than HH head (re)starts working, effect on prob. to moveh 0.01 0.14
Change in job and or workplace of any HH member, effect on prob. to moveh 0.37 3.21
HH member other than HH head stops working, effect on prob. to moveh -0.16 -2.59
Decrease in HH size in between 2002 and 2006, effect on prob. to movei 0.04 0.80
Increase in HH size in between 2002 and 2006, effect on prob. to movei 0.73 3.30
1− α1 scaled:
baseline 0.61 2.69
per additional HH member 0.20 3.18
β (1− α2) scaled:
baseline 0.43 3.56
per additional HH member -0.06 -2.23
β2γ2 scaled:
baseline 0.29 5.14
per additional HH member -0.02 -2.48
logsum: dwelling type choice in 2006 on prob. to move, own in 2002 0.51 3.98
logsum: dwelling type choice in 2006 on tenure type choice in 2006, rent in 2002, move 0.55 8.77
logsum: choice to move on dwelling type choice in 2002 0.69 7.14
logsum: dwelling type choice in 2002 on tenure type choice in 2002 0.86 11.21
a: reference: HH head works in 2002 and 2006 and HH rents the same dwelling over both period; b: reference is flat, same dwelling in 2002 and 2006
c : reference is flat in 2002 and move; d: reference is flat in 2006 and move
e : reference is flat in 2002; f : reference is flat in 2006;g : reference is stay
h: reference is no modification in job or workplace for every HH member; i: reference is no modification of HH structure
4 Conlusion
We developed a structural microeconomic framework to analyze simultaneously
several aspects of the dynamics of residential choices: location, dwelling, and tenure.
We accounted for intertemporal budget constraints while allowing for bequest mo-
tives. Our analytical formulation is tractable for empirical matters, and we therefore
proposed an econometric formulation of the approach by using a nested-Logit prob-
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abilistic choice models. We discussed demanding and stringent data requirements
to implement it.
Our work may however be further extended in several ways. First, the model
may be extended to a multi-period maximization program. Second, the assumption
about perfect information and perfect foresight of market variables is questionable.
The approach may be formulated as a dynamic discrete choice model with forward-
looking economic agents. We also think that using estimated parameters from the
econometric model would provide a better basis to perform simulation of an urban
system equilibrium.
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